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ABSTRACT
The principle of complementarity was supported by China
throughout the whole negotiation process of establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
However, China had
reservations over the way in which the principle of complementarity
was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute, which was part of
the rationale leading to China’s decision not to join the ICC at that
time. On one level, China’s concerns regarding complementarity
relate to the uncertainties about whether issues of fair trial per se
will be addressed by the ICC in the context of admissibility; at
another level, they echo China’s traditional position with respect to
international judicial bodies. This article examines the substance of
the articulated Chinese concerns regarding complementarity in light
of the ICC’s jurisprudence, China’s domestic judicial system, and its
progressively greater engagement with international adjudication to
see if these concerns still constitute a significant impediment to
China’s accession to the ICC. It also questions how the notion of,
and the discourse surrounding, Chinese characteristics or Asian
values on human rights may or may not explain Chinese and Asian
resistance to ICC participation in the context of complementarity.
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INTRODUCTION

China has long been supporting the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. It has considered that the
creation of such an institution is a positive addition to the
international legal system. To this end, China was actively involved
in the discussions leading to the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC).1 In the course of the negotiations, the Chinese
delegation identified and raised a range of specific concerns, some
of which were taken on board at that time, and some of which
remained outstanding. In 1998, at the conclusion of the Rome
Diplomatic Conference, while 120 countries voted in favor of the
adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, China was among the
seven states that voted against it. 2 The Chinese delegation
articulated several reasons for not joining the ICC at that time, which
were all framed in legal terms. 3 Since its negative vote in Rome,
China’s interest in the ICC has not diminished. In fact, China has
consistently maintained a dialogue with the ICC and involved itself
in the process leading to the Court’s continuous evolution.4 Despite
1
Bing Bing Jia, China and the International Criminal Court: Current Situation, 10
SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 87, 87-88 (2006).
2
Press Release, United Nations, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in
Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N.
Press
Release
L/2889
(July
20,
1998),
https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html
[https://perma.cc/SCB2-TNXB].
3
See Guangya Wang, in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 3d
plenary mtg., at 75, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3 (June 16, 1998) (reaffirming the
importance of the principle of complementarity in underpinning the actions and
decisions of the Court); see also Wensheng Qu, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 53d Sess.,
9th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/SR.9 (Nov. 4, 1998) (stating China’s comments
on several issues, such as jurisdictions, definitions of crimes, power of prosecutors,
and principle of complementarity).
4
See Guan Jian, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 15th mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.15 (Nov. 28, 2003) (highlighting China’s active involvement in
establishing the International Criminal Court and its continued support of its aims,
despite not being a signatory to the Rome Statute); see also Dahai Qi, in U.N. GAOR,
6th Comm., 59th Sess., 6th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.6, (Nov. 1, 2004)
(reaffirming China’s commitment to the goals of the International Criminal Court
as indicated by previous initiatives to support the work and development of the
Court); Xinmin Ma, Deputy Dir.-Gen. of the Dep’t of Treaty and Law of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of China, Statement of the Chinese Observer Delegation at the
General Debate in the 16th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 7, 2017), at 2, https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-CHI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZF99-
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being a non-party to the Rome Statute, the Chinese government
continued to send its delegates to meetings of the Assembly of States
Parties, where it voiced its views on a number of issues. 5 As a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, China also played
a constructive role in passing the resolutions of the Council
regarding the effective functioning of the ICC. 6 All these different
RWZ4] (transcript available in the International Criminal Court’s ASP Document
Index) (expressing China’s longstanding support for collective legal efforts to
combat international crime, including the International Criminal Court).
5
See Xinmin Ma, supra note 4, at 3–9 (suggesting as that the ICC adheres to
the Rome Statute and addresses crime of aggression cautiously); Guo Xiaomei,
Counselor of the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of China (China Observer Delegation) at the 14th Session of the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Nov. 18–26, 2015),
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/GenDeb/ASP14-GenDeb--OSChina-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL42-8AJ9] (transcript available in the
International Criminal Court’s ASP Documents Index) (recommending that the
International Criminal Court adheres to the principle of complementarity and those
aims established in the UN Charter to effectively implement the objectives of the
Rome Statute); Xinmin Ma, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Treaty
and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (Observer Delegation) at the
13th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International
Criminal
Court,
(Dec.
8–17,
2014),
https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/GenDeba/ICC-ASP13-GenDeba-ChinaENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BMU-PYDG] (transcript available in the
International Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index) (urging the International
Criminal Court to achieve a consensus view on the interpretation and application
of the Rome Statute to enhance the legitimacy of the Court); Statement of China at
11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 15, 2012), https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICC-ASP11-GenDeba-CHNENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript available in the International
Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index) (reiterating China’s view that the
International Criminal Court must adhere to the UN Charter and the principle of
complementarity, respect non-member states, and pursue both crime prevention
and peace creation); Xu Hong, Head of Chinese Delegation, at the General Debate
of the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International
Criminal
Court
(Nov.
20,
2009),
https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-ChinaENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3SB-A439] (transcript available in the ASP’s
Document Index) (advising the International Criminal Court to observe the guiding
principles of international law and encouraging other countries to engage in the
improvement and development of the Court).
6
China voted in favor of the Security Council resolution referring the
situation of Libya to the International Criminal Court. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491st
mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011). See generally S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26,
2011) (referring the situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the International
Criminal Court). China abstained in the Security Council vote referring the
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess.,
5158th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005). See generally S.C. Res. 1593
(Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal
Court).
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forms of engagement indicate that China has left open the possibility
of full participation in the ICC.
As of September 1, 2019, the ICC has been in operation for more
than 15 years and has 122 member states.7 There appears to be an
irreversible momentum towards the establishment and ongoing
refinement of a system of international criminal justice designed to
bring to account those responsible for international crimes.
Historically, China was involved and played a significant role in the
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military
Tribunals and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.8 China’s reluctance to
join the ICC, however, has led to doubts regarding China’s
international reputation as a large and responsible nation upholding
international justice and human rights. The ICC, on the other hand,
requires sustained support and cooperation from states in order to
be truly representative and effective. Representing one-fifth of the
world’s population and being part of the most underrepresented
region at the ICC, China’s participation would be a step towards the
Court’s universality. With no enforcement mechanism of its own,
the ICC’s effective functioning is largely dependent on the
cooperation it receives from party states. Lack of cooperation by
non-party states, especially major powers such as China, the U.S.,
and Russia, will severely constrain its effectiveness.
While China is on its way to becoming a global superpower, it
still refers to itself as the world’s largest developing country and
places great emphasis on the principle of sovereignty. The various
Chinese concerns towards the ICC are likely to demonstrate its dual
roles: first, as the leader of developing countries trying to prevent
unjustified encroachments into their domestic affairs and second, as
a global power to guard against the weakening of its authority
among the United Nations Security Council and its permanent
members. Thus, a close examination of the Chinese perspective will
feed into broader debates on the trends of state engagement and
disengagement with the ICC among different world blocs. Those
7
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%2
0the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/RM4Y-ZXSU].
8
See Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (expressing China’s support for the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Jian Chen, in U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3175th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (Feb. 22, 1993) (expressing China’s support
for the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
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concerns involve questions about national sovereignty, noninterference in particular, that are not singular to China, but are
shared by most of the other Asian states which have not ratified the
Statute. 9 The overall relationship between Asia and the ICC can be
described as one of particular hesitation. 10 China, as the most
populous and powerful country in the region, is an influential actor.
As such, addressing conceivable legal obstacles for China’s
accession to the ICC could potentially inspire other Asian states to
engage more directly with the Court.
China’s relationship with the ICC is also part of its broader
dialogue with international adjudication and international law.
Given its rapidly rising power, China has revised its traditional
pattern of distancing itself from international mechanisms of a
judicial character, 11 and there have been substantial Chinese
movements in relation to international adjudication in certain areas
since the 1990s.12 However, the level of confidence held by China in
engaging with international adjudicative bodies has not yet
transmitted to those governing human rights issues. A study on
Chinese concerns about the ICC will help better explain why this
hesitancy has persisted despite China’s fast-growing competence in
international adjudication and global legal affairs. These broader
implications suggest the need for a profound and deep
understanding of China’s position on the ICC.
The Chinese position towards the ICC is based on a range of
specific concerns, which can be grouped into two kinds. One is on
9
See Xing Yun, Asia’s Reticence Towards Universal Jurisdiction, 4(1) GRONINGEN
J. INT’L L. 54, 58 (2016) (explaining Asian states’ imperative to protect national
sovereignty and their commitment to the principle of non-intervention, rooted in
their historical experience of imperialism, which can limit their participation in and
hinder the efforts of international organizations).
10
See Simon Chesterman, International Criminal Law with Asian Characteristics?
14-16 (Nat’l Univ. of Sing. L. Working Paper No. 2014/002, 2014) (noting the low
proportion of Asian states that accept the International Criminal Court’s
jurisdiction and similarly, the lack of Asian state engagement in the Court’s
discussions).
11
See Phil C. W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law since the Opium
War, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 886 (2014) (explaining that China’s reticence to
participate in international judicial organizations is underpinned by a belief that
interstate conflicts should be resolved through negotiation rather than legal
proceedings).
12
See Dan Zhu, China, the International Criminal Court, and International
Adjudication, 61 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 43, 55 (2014) (noting China’s increased
involvement in international adjudication in the economic and technical areas,
although its involvement has been least pronounced in the domain of human
rights).
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the jurisdictional issue of the ICC, and the other concerns the
definition of the core crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. While
the Chinese concerns about the core crimes are ICC-specific, the
jurisdictional concerns have historical resonance with China’s
traditional approach towards international judicial bodies, which
includes a strong emphasis on a strict concept of sovereignty. The
principle of complementary jurisdiction was supported by China
throughout the whole negotiation process, but China had
reservations over the way in which the principle of complementarity
was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute. Given the
centrality of state sovereignty to the Chinese thinking in
international legal matters, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction
and its practical application hold great importance to China’s
consideration of its relationship with the ICC.
While concern with complementary jurisdiction was articulated
by the Chinese authorities as one of the legal barriers preventing its
move towards full participation in the ICC in 1998, the Court has
been in operation for over a decade, and there have been substantive
developments both in law and in practice surrounding the ICC
Statute. Undoubtedly, back in 1998, there was still a lack of clarity
as to precisely how aspects of the complementarity principle would
apply in practice; matters like this would only become clear after the
Court had the opportunity to consider, in detail, the relevant terms
of the Rome Statute governing complementary jurisdiction during
the course of proceedings brought before it. The question remains
as to whether the Chinese concerns have become less robust or have
been cured in the light of relevant developments.
The Chinese perspective on the ICC’s complementarity regime,
however, has been subject to relatively little sustained academic
attention to date. Although there is a growing body of literature
discussing the overall China-ICC relationship from either a legal,13

13
See Jianping Lu & Zhixiang Wang, China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 608, 619 (2005) (setting forth reasons in favor of Chinese participation in
the ICC, including mutual interests, the ICC’s capacity to adjudicate issues
concerning non-state parties, and the rights associated with State Party status); see,
e.g., Dan Zhu, From Tokyo to Rome: A Chinese Perspective, in HISTORICAL WAR CRIMES
TRIALS IN ASIA 31 (Daqun Liu & Binxin Zhang eds., 2016) (tracing China’s reluctance
to engage in international criminal tribunals, in part, to the perceived deficiencies
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East after World War II, but also
reiterating China’s longstanding support of the establishment and development of
the International Criminal Court).
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policy, 14 or comparative perspective, 15 as well as the Chinese
attitude towards the core crimes under the Rome Statute,16 almost
no systemic studies have been made on China’s specific concerns
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional regime. This article, therefore,
aims to fill the academic vacuum by critically examining the Chinese
position in the context of the design and emerging practice of the
ICC’s complementarity regime. Against the above background, the
article is structured as follows. It first provides a description of
China’s engagement with negotiations on the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC and the arguments made by the Chinese
authorities during this process. It then examines the Chinese
concerns relating to complementarity, both in the abstract and in
light of the subsequent developments, to see if they are legally
sound and still as significant as they first appeared. As China’s
position on the ICC’s complementarity system is partly informed by
its domestic situation, this article continues to assess the extent to
which China’s national criminal judicial system meets international
standards. In addition, as China and other Asian states traditionally
hold an almost absolutist understanding of national sovereignty and
14
See Congrui Qiao, On Discrepancy and Synergy Between China and the
International Criminal Court, FICHL Policy Brief Series, no. 72, 2016, at 4 (recognizing
the forces drawing China into participating more actively with the International
Criminal Court in competition with concerns reinforcing China’s reservations to do
so); see, e.g., Ken Yang, Prudence without Collateral Damage: China and International
Criminal Justice, FICHL Policy Brief Series, no. 61, 2016, at 2 (discussing negative
views in the international community concerning China’s reservations to engage in
international criminal law initiatives, by way of perceptions concerning a Chinese
newspaper’s editorial in 2015).
15
See Suzannah Linton, India and China Before, At, and After Rome, 16 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 265, 265 (2018) (comparing China and India’s participation in the
creation and development of the International Criminal Court); see, e.g., Alexander
Dukalskis, Northeast Asia and the International Criminal Court: Measuring Normative
Disposition, 17 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 29, 29 (2017) (comparing the interactions between
the International Criminal Court and certain Northeast Asian countries, including
China, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan).
16
See Dan Zhu, China, Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal
Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1021, 1023 (2018) (examining Chinese concerns
regarding the definition of crimes against humanity under the ICC’s jurisdiction
and its impact on China’s future accession to the Court.); Dan Zhu, China, the Crime
of Aggression, and the International Criminal Court, 5 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 94, 95 (2015)
(analyzing China’s concerns regarding the inclusion of the crime of aggression in
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction); Jing Guan, The ICC’s Jurisdiction
over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for China’s
Accession?, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 703, 754 (2010) (examining China’s concerns
over the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes in international
conflicts and the ways in which these concerns should not inhibit China from
joining the Court).
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non-interference in relation to matters involving human rights, this
article consequently questions how that traditional approach
adopted by these Asian states may or may not explain their
resistance to ICC participation in the context of complementarity.
Since the ICC is part of a broader landscape of international courts
and tribunals, this article also considers the substance of the specific
Chinese concerns regarding complementary jurisdiction in light of
China’s engagement with international judicial bodies, and some of
the traditional concerns that have had an impact on that
engagement. It concludes by assessing the extent to which the
Chinese concerns about complementarity would affect China’s
accession to the ICC in years to come.
2.

THE NEGOTIATION HISTORY OF THE ICC’S COMPLEMENTARITY
REGIME AND CONCERNS OF CHINA

The principle of complementarity is widely regarded as one of
the cornerstones of the architecture of the Rome Statute.17 In the
quest for agreement on the Statute, the relationship between the
International Criminal Court and national criminal jurisdictions
proved to be a pivotal issue at the heart of states’ concerns about
their sovereignty. China, whilst supporting the establishment of
international criminal tribunals, was reluctant to create a body that
could impinge on national sovereignty.18
2.1 China’s sovereignty concerns and complementarity
This kind of concern can be traced back to the establishment of
the ad hoc tribunals, which raised for the first time the question of
the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of national
courts and that of an international criminal tribunal.19 While the
17
See, e.g., Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight
against Impunity, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 591, 593 (2003) (describing the
centrality of complementarity in the ICC Statute).
18
See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 41 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 1999).
19
See Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction
of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 385
(1998).
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Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) recognize that national courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over crimes within the competence of these tribunals,
they endow the international bodies with primacy over national
courts. 20 China expressed its concern that the adoption of these
Statutes giving the ad hoc tribunals preferential jurisdiction was not
in compliance with the principle of state judicial sovereignty.21
While the intrusion upon sovereignty under the primacy model
could be accommodated by China in very specific instances,22 China
has been reluctant to yield its jurisdiction to an international
criminal court permanently. In 1994, China cautioned that “the
proposed court [the ICC] should not replace or override systems of
national criminal or universal jurisdiction: the relationship must be
a complementary one.” 23 In 1996, China reiterated that “[s]tates
must bear the primary responsibility for the prevention and
punishment of international crimes. In the majority of cases, the
judicial system of a State played a leading role which could not be
superseded. An international criminal court could function only as
an adjunct to national courts.”24
The Chinese concerns, to a certain extent, were accommodated
by the concept of complementarity, which provided for the primacy
of states’ jurisdiction. As a key element of the Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court prepared by the International Law
Commission, the principle of complementarity was regarded by
China as “the most important guiding principle of the Statute.”25 It,
20
See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Res. 1901, art. 8 (Dec. 16,
2009); International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Res. 1877, art. 9(1)
(July 7, 2009).
21
See Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (reiterating China’s opposition to establishing an
international tribunal by Security Council resolution); Zhaoxing Li, in U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (stating China’s
concerns about the precedent raised).
22
See Zhaoxing Li 49th Sess., supra note 21, at 11; Zhaoxing Li 48th Sess., supra
note 21, at 33.
23
Kening Zhang, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 18th mtg. at 10, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.18 (Oct. 26, 1994).
24
Shiqiu Chen, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 28th mtg. at 20, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.28 (Oct. 31, 1996).
25
Guangya Wang, in U.N. Diplomatic Conference Official Records of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (June 16, 1998); see also Wensheng Qu, supra
note 3, at 6 (declaring the importance of complementarity).
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however, raised concerns about how to precisely define the
complementarity regime.26 In the view of China, the principle of
complementarity was not fully implemented in the operative part of
the draft statute, and some provisions appeared to be contrary to it,27
including the term “unwillingness” defined by Article 17 of the
Rome Statute,28 and the automatic jurisdiction under Article 12.29
2.2 The criteria of admissibility and concerns of China
Complementarity was eventually regulated by the Rome
Statute’s provisions on the admissibility of a case and it thus belongs
to the broader issue of admissibility, rather than jurisdiction. Article
17(2) of the ICC Statute declares that “having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international law,” the
Court is to consider whether the purpose of the national proceedings
was to shelter an offender,30 whether they have been unjustifiably
delayed,31 or whether they fail to be conducted in a manner which
was independent or impartial, and they were or are being conducted
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 32 In the view of
China, this provision “hardly reflected the principle of
complementarity; on the contrary, the Court seemed to have become
an appeals court sitting above the national court.”33
In fact, during the negotiating process, China was not alone in
fearing the Court would become an appeal court.

26
See Shiqiu Chen, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 50th Sess., 25th mtg. at 13–14,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.25 (Oct. 30, 1995) (arguing that the ICC should not become
a “supranational court”).
27
See id. (arguing that, regretfully, the principle of complementarity had not
been fully implemented in the operative part).
28
Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that Article 17 might allow the
ICC to negate a decision of a national court).
29
See Jielong Duan, in U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 52nd Sess., 11th mtg. at 12,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/52/SR.11 (Nov. 4, 1997) (arguing against giving the ICC
jurisdiction over all “core crimes”).
30 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.17, ¶ 2(a), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
31 See id. at art. 17, ¶ 2(b).
32 See id. at art. 17, ¶ 2(c).
33
Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6.
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While most delegations agreed that the ICC could take
jurisdiction where no national proceedings were underway,
there was disagreement about whether the ICC should have
the power to step in where a national investigation or
prosecution was underway, but was in reality a “sham”
proceeding designed to thwart international justice.34
Many delegations were sensitive to the potential for the Court to
function as a kind of appeals court, passing judgments on the
decision and proceedings of national judicial systems.35 They were
therefore opposed to the ICC being empowered to judge national
judicial systems. 36 China, in particular, expressed the view that
“[t]he International Criminal Court had only a complementary role
to play in the event that a State’s judicial system collapsed,”37 but
“[i]ts jurisdiction should not apply when a case was already being
investigated, prosecuted, or tried by a given country.”38
At the beginning of the negotiations, China cautioned that “[t]he
international criminal court should not supplant national courts, nor
should it become a supranational court or act as an appeal court for
national court judgements,” otherwise it “would violate the
principle of complementarity.” 39 As negotiations continued,
resistance to the inclusion of the concept of willingness started to
decline.
The majority view was that a failure to include
unwillingness as a ground for the ICC to assume jurisdiction could
amount to an invitation for states to block the Court’s jurisdiction by
initiating investigation or prosecutions merely to protect the
perpetrators. 40 In attempting to allay the concerns that the ICC
would become an appellate body to review decisions of domestic
courts, the delegations agreed that the criteria permitting ICC

34
DAN ZHU, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 82 (Zhimin
Chen et al. eds, 2018); see also Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching
Agreement at the Rome Conference, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 69 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
35
See Holmes, supra note 18, at 49.
36
See Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INTL’L L. & POL’Y 281, 284
(1997).
37
Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6.
38
Guangya Wang, supra note 25, at 75.
39
Shiqiu Chen, supra note 26, at 13–14.
40
See Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, Article 17, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OBSERVERS’ NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 610 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008); Holmes, supra note 18, at 48.
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intervention should be as objective as possible.41 Yet it is clear that
the Court has to maintain necessary subjectivity in order to have a
degree of “latitude” when deciding on states’ unwillingness. 42 The
phrase “principles of due process recognized by international law”
was added to the chapeau of Article 17(2) in response to concerns
raised by some delegations, including China, that the three
subparagraphs gave the Court unduly broad discretion to determine
unwillingness and insufficient objective criteria on which the Court
should base its ruling.43 This language was originally intended to
be added to the paragraph that dealt with the independence and
impartiality of the national proceedings in order to ensure greater
objectivity. 44 As the negotiations continued, several delegations
favored the change, yet indicated their concern that this still left
other criteria relating to unwillingness less objective. Accordingly,
it was added to the chapeau that the phrase “principles of due
process recognized by international law” would serve all the subparagraphs.45
This solution, however, did not satisfy China, who had proposed
a different approach in order to make the criteria more objective.
The suggestion made by the Chinese delegation was that in
Paragraph 2(a) the words “in violation of the country’s law” be
added after the words “the national decision was made.”46 Further,
in Paragraph 2(b), a reference to “national rules of procedure”
should be included, and in Paragraph 2(c) a reference to “the general
applicable standards of national rules of procedure.”47 However,
China’s preference for making reference to national law and
procedure in determining the unwillingness of a state to carry out
an investigation was eventually rejected by the Rome Conference.
After the adoption of the Rome Statute, China reiterated its concerns
that:
As stipulated in article 17, the Court could judge ongoing
legal proceedings in any State, including a non-party, in
41
See John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 673–74
(Antonio Cassese et al. ed., 2002).
42
See Holmes, supra note 18, at 48.
43
See id. at 53.
44
See id.
45
Williams & Schabas, supra note 40, at 612.
46
Yanduan Li, in Rome Diplomatic Conference Official Records, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.12, June 23, 1998, 218.
47
Id. at 218.
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order to determine whether [ . . . ] the trial was fair, and
could exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of that decision. In
other words, the Statute authorized the Court to judge the
judicial system and legal proceedings of a State and negate
the decision of the national court. What was worse, the
criteria for determining whether a trial was fair or whether a
State had the intention to shield a criminal were very
subjective and ambiguous. For instance, under article 17,
paragraph 2, the normal legal proceedings of a State might
be determined to be unfair or intended to shield the criminal.
It was highly possible that such a provision would be abused
for political purposes. In Rome, his delegation had worked
hard for the adoption of a more objective set of criteria, but
without success.48
2.3. Automatic jurisdiction and concerns of China
China considered the automatic jurisdiction of the ICC to be
inconsistent with the principle of complementarity. In fact, the
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was another controversial
issue in all the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the
ICC. 49 One question was how a state would accept the Court’s
jurisdiction—whether states would automatically accept the court’s
jurisdiction over crimes as soon as ratification took place, or whether
they would have to give specific acceptance to the Court’s
jurisdiction over each particular crime.50 China argued for an opt-in
system whereby jurisdiction over certain crimes was not conferred
automatically on the Court by the sole fact of becoming a party to
the ICC Statute, but that in addition, a special declaration was
needed to that effect.51 However, the opt-in system favored by the
Wensheng Qu, supra note 3, at 6.
See Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 12, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OBSERVERS’ NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 547, 548 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) (describing how a
“fundamental issue in all stages of the debate was whether . . . the ICC would have
vested in it inherent jurisdictions to prosecute the crimes listed in article 5 on
account of ratification or acceptance of the Statute”).
50
See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 3 (1999).
51
See Shiqui Chen, supra note 26, at 14 (stating that the court’s jurisdiction
would derive from the voluntary consent of parties and would not be mandatory);
see also Shiqui Chen, supra note 24, at 20; Guangya Wang, in Opening Speech to the
48
49
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Chinese authorities was not adopted by the Rome Statute; rather,
Article 12 granted the ICC automatic jurisdiction over the crimes
listed in Article 5 without the additional consent of states parties.52
The Chinese delegation pointed out that “[t]he inherent jurisdiction
of the court, when extended to cover all core crimes, would accord
precedence to the court over national courts; that was clearly at
variance with the principle of complementarity.”53
The logic of China’s proposition can be found in the argument
by James Crawford, who noted that, under Article 12, “the
requirement of separate consent to jurisdiction is removed for states
parties to the Statute.”54 As a corollary, he pointed out that “the
principle of complementarity has no effect in determining the
existence of [the ICC’s] jurisdiction.”55 It would retain its force only
in terms of the exercise of jurisdiction, which “is to be given effect
by the Prosecutor in deciding whether to take forward an
investigation, and by the Court in deciding whether to authorise a
prosecution” at the level of admissibility.56 Under the opt-in system
provided by the International Law Commission (ILC) draft, the
principle of complementarity had effects on both levels: the
existence of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which was determined by the
state consent regime, and the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction,
which was effectuated by the admissibility system. The Rome
Statute, however, defines the question of complementarity as
pertaining to the admissibility of a case rather than to the
jurisdiction of the Court.57 In other words, state consent as a first
layer of protection for state sovereignty at the level of the existence
of jurisdiction has been removed by the Rome Statute; accordingly,

UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, June 16, 1998, at 8, http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616cpr.htm
[https://perma.cc/6T2L-QGLP]; Yanduan Li, in Rome Diplomatic Conference
Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.8, June 19, 1998, ¶¶ 37-38.
52
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force Jul. 1, 2002).
53
Jielong Duan, supra note 29, at 12; see also Shiqui Chen, supra note 26, at 20.
54
James Crawford, The Drafting of the Rome Statute, in FROM NUREMBERG TO
THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109, 147 (Philippe
Sands ed., 2003).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 148.
57
See Benzing, supra note 17, at 594 (explaining that because complementarity
affects only a case’s admissibility, it determines when the ICC may exercise its
jurisdiction, not whether the ICC has jurisdiction).
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the principle of complementarity is relevant only at the admissibility
stage on the level of the exercise of jurisdiction.
3.

THE CRITERIA OF ‘UNWILLINGNESS’ AND CHINA’S FAIR TRIAL
CONCERNS

In scrutinizing the concerns of China, it is important to first
examine whether the criteria of “unwillingness” would permit the
ICC to intervene only when the national proceedings are conducted
for the purpose of shielding perpetrators of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, or if it would allow the Court to examine all
issues in relation to “due process,” including “fair trial,” as
perceived by China. In the latter situation, the ICC’s role with
respect to national criminal jurisdiction would be more analogous to
that of an international appeals court, vested with review authority,
passing judgment on the decisions and proceedings of national
judicial systems. If this is the case, perhaps the concerns voiced by
China are warranted.
3.1. The controversies surrounding the criteria of “unwillingness” and
concerns of China
The reference to “principles of due process recognized by
international law” in the chapeau of Article 17(2) has given rise to
controversies over its interpretation. Scholars’ views are divided on
whether a violation of human rights at the domestic level renders a
case admissible before the ICC. On the one hand, some have argued
that:
[T]he phrase “having regard to the principles of due process
recognized by international law” . . . requires that the
assessment of the quality of justice, as reflected in the
subparagraphs (a)–(c) [of Article 17(2)], takes into
consideration “procedural” as well as “substantive” due
process rights . . . enshrined in human rights instruments
and developed in the jurisprudence of international judicial
bodies.58
58
MOHAMED M. EL ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 169 (2008).
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Therefore, a state’s failure to guarantee a defendant’s due
process rights, most notably fair trial rights as recognized in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), makes
a case admissible under Article 17 of the Rome Statute.59 On the
other hand, the view has been expressed “that the purpose of the
complementarity principle (and the main purpose of the Rome
Statute) is to prevent impunity and not to secure the suspect’s fair
trial.” 60 The ICC will not be equally entitled to step in when
violations of due process by the national court occur to the detriment,
rather than to the benefit, of the person subjected to the
proceedings.61
59
See Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 241 (2002)
(explaining that states that fail to protect the due process rights of defendants may
be subject to the ICC exercising its jurisdiction); see also Federica Gioia, State
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International Law: The Principle of
Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1095, 1111
(2006) (discussing how “allowing the ICC to remedy the failures of national courts
in complying with due process standards seems entirely consistent with this role”
as an international body complementing national jurisdictions in meting out fair
punishment for the most serious crimes); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law,
1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 112–13 (2003) (reaffirming that, under complementarity,
states lose the right to exercise jurisdiction in criminal cases if they fail to meet
international standards of due process); cf. Albin Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction:
Against Fletcher’s Antagonism, 39 U. TULSA L. REV. 955, 963 (2004) (testimony of
Monroe Leigh) (arguing that “the Treaty of Rome contains the most comprehensive
list of due process protections which has so far been promulgated”).
60
JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 221 (2008).
61
See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 156–57 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that ICC intervention requires
a showing that the State is unwilling or unable to conduct “proceedings genuinely”
with the “intent to bring the person concerned to justice”); see also Benzing, supra
note 17, at 598 (noting that the ICC “was established to address situations” in which
“a breach of human rights standards works in favour of the accused”); cf. Enrique
Carnero Rojo, The Role of Fair Trial Considerations in the Complementarity Regime of the
International Criminal Court: From ‘No Peace without Justice’ to ‘No Peace with Victor’s
Justice’?, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 829, 869 (2005) (arguing that the human rights
mentioned in Article 17(2) were not read as standards for the Court to protect the
individual against possible abuses by the state, but as standards for the Court to
prevent state authorities from shielding a person from accountability). But see
Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the
Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L. F. 255, 257 (2006) (arguing that
Article 17 permits the Court to find a State “unwilling or unable” only if its legal
proceedings are designed to make a defendant more difficult to convict. If its legal
proceedings are designed to make the defendant easier to convict, the provision
requires the Court to defer to the State no matter how unfair those proceedings may
be).
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The latter view seems to be more persuasive, for it finds support
in the wording of the Statute and its “preparatory works.” “The
general rule of interpretation laid down in [Article 31 paragraph 1
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] does not allow
establishing an abstract meaning of a phrase, divorced from the
place which that phrase occupies in the text to be interpreted.” 62
Accordingly, the chapeau and the three subparagraphs under
Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute should be interpreted conjunctively:
the Court can only find a state to be unwilling if the national
proceeding both violates international due process and satisfies one
of the three conditions specified in Article 17(2), which more or less
include the requirement of shielding the person concerned from
justice. As such, it is not possible to “read in” a stand-alone due
process requirement to Article 17(2), given that all three
subparagraphs deal with circumstances benefitting the accused, not
prejudicing her rights. During the Rome negotiations, Italy
proposed a definition of unwillingness which mandated the ICC to
assess whether the fundamental rights of the accused were
respected or not; that proposal was consequently rejected.63 This is
clear evidence that the drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend
to grant the ICC jurisdiction to look into stand-alone due process
violations. The purpose of the Statute also leaves no doubt that the
ICC was not created to monitor the fairness of the domestic
proceedings. As such, unwillingness cannot be declared simply
because domestic proceedings fail to ensure international fair trial
standards.
Perhaps a close analogy can be made between Article 17 analysis
in the ICC and the ICTY’s experience with Article 11 bis under the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which permits the Tribunal to
transfer some defendants who are parties for domestic trial to states,
provided certain criteria are met. 64 Under Rule 11 bis, the ICTY
Oliver Dörr, Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation, in VIENNA CONVENTION
543 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach
eds., 2012).
63
See Draft Proposal by Italy on Article 35 (Issues of Admissibility), U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/IP.4 (Aug. 5, 1997) (stating how “[i]n deciding on issues of
admissibility under this article, the Court shall consider whether . . . (ii) the said
investigations or proceedings . . . were or are conducted with full respect for the
fundamental rights of the accused”).
64
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50 (July 8, 2015).
62

ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY
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judges must be satisfied that the accused would receive a fair trial
domestically and that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has set out
specific factors for assessing fairness in domestic proceedings.65 It
should, however, be noted that the ICTY was established through a
very different political process and has primacy over domestic
courts,66 which is radically different than the ICC’s complementarity
system. The creators of the ICC have already ruled out the
possibility of granting the Court jurisdiction on the basis of due
process violations in national proceedings. Even if one might be
politically sympathetic to the need to respect due process rights,67
the door is now closed for such considerations under the current
legal framework of the Rome Statute. However, the practice of the
ICC, so far, has suggested otherwise, and it is likely to intensify
China’s human rights concerns.
3.2. The ICC’s practice in relation to ‘unwillingness’
The challenges brought by Libya to the admissibility of the cases
against Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi offered the ICC a
chance to clarify the extent to which domestic fair trial violations
matter for the purpose of assessing unwillingness under Article 17
of the Rome Statute. The government of Libya filed submissions
under Article 19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute to challenge the
admissibility before the ICC of the cases concerning Gaddafi and Al65
See Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal
Court, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 346–347 (2015) (highlighting how “[i]n most
[Rule 11 bis decisions], the panel recalls [the due-process factors established in
Mejakic], then cross-references them against the criminal code of the country to
which the accused is to be transferred and determines if there are any significant
gaps”).
66
See S.C. Res. 827, at 2 (May 25, 1993) (resolving that “an international
tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991”).
67
See Angela Walker, The ICC Versus Libya: How to End the Cycle of Impunity for
Atrocity Crimes by Protecting Due Process, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 303,
333–38 (2014) (arguing that the ICC must assume a role in protecting the due
process right of the accused to be “a ‘meaningful’ enforcement mechanism”); see
also Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous”
National Court Prosecutions, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 569, 596 (2013) (suggesting that
ICC judges could more liberally interpret Article 17 as making a case admissible
before the ICC when domestic courts fail to provide due process).
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Senussi on May 1, 2012, and April 2, 2013, respectively. 68 Libya
submitted that the cases were inadmissible on the grounds that its
national judicial system was actively investigating both individuals
and their alleged crimes. 69 On the other hand, Gaddafi and AlSenussi’s defense argued that the Court should declare a case
admissible if the accused would not receive an acceptable fair trial
in accordance with the basic international standards of due
process.70 In the Gaddafi case, both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the
Appeals Chamber did not consider it necessary to address the issue
of fair trial in the context of unwillingness, as Libya was unable to
genuinely carry out investigations.71
In assessing the admissibility of Al-Senussi’s case, the Pre-Trial
Chamber had to deal with the arguments of the defense, which
alleged that, due to the lack of legal representation as well as lack of
independence and impartiality, the domestic proceedings against
the defendant were being conducted in violation of his fundamental

68
See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to
Article 19 of the ICC Statute (May 1, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_05322.PDF
[https://perma.cc/4BKG-Z4SV];
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/1101/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Relating to Abdullah AlSenussi Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02635.PDF [https://perma.cc/8VBJ-4JHQ].
69
See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11-130-Red Application on behalf of the Government of Libya
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, ¶ 68 (May 1, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/4BKG-Z4SV]; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah
Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-307-Red, Application on behalf of the
Government of Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the
ICC Statute, ¶¶ 42-52 (Apr. 2, 2013), [https://perma.cc/8VBJ-4JHQ].
70 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11-190-Corr-Red, Public Redacted Version of the Corrigendum to
the “Defence Response to the ‘Application on behalf of the Government of Libya
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute’,” ¶ 37-46 (July 31, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07805.PDF
[https://perma.cc/M2WN-MUVQ]
(expounding upon the use of the ICC to implement fair trials).
71 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi,
¶
216
(May
31,
2013),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_04031.PDF
[https://perma.cc/5ZH5-6RZU];
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/1101/11 OA 4, Judgment on the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 31 May 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case
Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”, ¶ 210 (May 21, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04273.PDF [https://perma.cc/YCT2-JHR8].
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rights.72 In ruling that the case against Al-Senussi was inadmissible
before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber “emphasize[d] that alleged
violations of the accused’s procedural rights are not per se grounds
for a finding of unwillingness under Article 17 of the Statute.” 73
According to the Chamber, violations of procedural rights would be
relevant only when they are inconsistent with the intent to bring the
defendant to justice.74 The Appeals Chamber subsequently affirmed
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment. 75 Addressing a variety of
challenges brought by Al-Senussi, the Appeals Chamber concluded
that Libya’s failure to appoint counsel for Al-Senussi did not make
it unwilling to prosecute under the Rome Statute,76 but its reasoning
somehow sent a confusing message about whether domestic due
process violations per se could serve as a ground for admissibility.
On one hand, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that “the Court
was not established to be an international court of human rights,
sitting in judgment over domestic legal systems to ensure that they
are compliant with international standards of human rights.”77 The
Chamber suggested that the primary reason for the inclusion of
Article 17(2) was not to guarantee fair trial rights of the accused.78
However, it also noted that “human rights standards may assist the
Court in its assessment of whether the proceedings are or were
conducted ‘independently or impartially’ within the meaning of
article 17(2)(c).” 79 The Chamber tried to strike a balance and
distinguished human rights violations that did not affect the
genuine nature of the justice process from those egregious violations
that prevented genuine forms of justice for the accused to take

72 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abudullah AlSenussi,
¶
220
(Oct.
11,
2013),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_07445.PDF [https://perma.cc/CVD8-EHA8].
73
Id. ¶ 235.
74
Id.
75 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision
on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi”, ¶ 170 (July 24,
2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF
[https://perma.cc/AC6S-WSLC].
76
Id. ¶ 200.
77
Id. ¶ 219.
78
Id.
79
Id. ¶ 220.
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place.80 The latter violations were considered by the Chamber as
relevant in assessing unwillingness, but not the former. 81 The
Chamber especially declined to countenance “proceedings that are,
in reality, little more than a predetermined prelude to an execution,
and which are therefore contrary to even the most basic
understanding of justice.”82 “The [Appeals] Chamber was clearly
wary of transforming itself into a human rights tribunal, yet it was
plainly so bothered by the show trial hypothetical that it left the door
open for consideration of due process and human rights norms.”83
The Chamber, however, did not provide any tangible criteria
regarding when due process violations become so egregious as to
command the Article 17 analysis. In the absence of defined terms,
“the judges are left with wide discretionary powers, which carry the
risk of inconsistent interpretations.”84
Although the drafters of the Rome Statute specifically rejected
violations of due process as grounds for admissibility, the Appeals
Chamber has nevertheless read a due process component into the
language of Article 17 of the Statute. This practice has raised the
issue of “overly creative judicial interpretation,” 85 or judicial
activism, which represents a deviation in implementation of the
announced public policy decisions of the legislators.86 In fact, the
tendency for international criminal courts or tribunals to engage in
judicial activism was prevalent in the jurisprudence of the ICC’s
immediate predecessors, especially the ICTY. 87 The definition of
Id. ¶ 230.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal
Court, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 332 (2015).
84
Nidal N. Jurdi, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court
in Practice: Is it Truly Serving the Purpose? Some Lessons from Libya, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 199, 213 (2017).
85
See Chatham House, The International Criminal Court and Libya:
Complementarity in Conflict, International Law Programme Meeting Summary, 8
(2014),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2014
0922Libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PAC-23SX].
86
See Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An
Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 377, 386–87 (2006).
87
Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly, The International Criminal Tribunals and the
Judicial Development of International Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1, 3–10 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds.,
2010).
80
81
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crimes against humanity is a prime example. In 1993 when the ICTY
Statute was adopted, it may well have been that customary
international law required a nexus between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict,88 or, at best, that the existence of such
a requirement was subject to debate.89 The majority judges of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić Case nevertheless concluded
that such a requirement was inconsistent with customary
international law. 90 The subsequent negotiations to establish the
ICC preponderantly took the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals
as reflecting customary international law and incorporated it in the
Rome Statute, but the proposal to omit the armed conflict
requirement was met with some resistance and a number of states,
including China, were against the innovative interpretations made
by Tadić Appeals Chamber.91 Although most drafters of the Rome
Statute “appreciated the results of judicial activism in the past, they
were not anxious for it to be repeated.” 92 Keenly aware of the
potential risk, the creators of the ICC equipped the Court with a
well-prepared and detailed legal framework to limit possible space
for judicial activism or, at a minimum, make it more difficult to
justify. 93
In contrast with its predecessors, the ICC Appeals Chamber’s
overly creative judicial interpretation of “unwillingness” is striking,
as it is not the result of interpretation or customary norms, but rather
of detailed and clear wording of the Rome Statute; thus exhibiting
its activist attitude. It should be noted that “judicial activism is not
perceived to be the same as judicial lawmaking,” which “is an
88
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
89
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS; THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 188 (2006).
90
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
2,
1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm
[https://perma.cc/H7P9-565Y].
91 See generally DARRYL ROBINSON & HERMAN VON HEBEL, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
93 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 1999) (claiming that China and a number of Middle Eastern
states continued to support the retention of a requirement of a nexus with an armed
conflict at the Rome conference, which could be considered as an implicit indication
that these countries did not agree with the Tadic Chamber on its interpretations).
92
William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 755 (2008).
93
Id. at 755–56.
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acknowledged phenomenon in international law” and an
appropriate discharge of the judicial function. 94 Rather, courts
practicing judicial activism deem themselves entitled to “ignore
expressions of authoritative policy and assume a competence” to
determine on their own what the law should be. 95 The Appeals
Chamber’s decision was activist in that it was counter to both the
text of the Statute and the intent of its drafters. Because the ICC was
established and possesses jurisdiction solely through state consent
as expressed in a multilateral treaty, the Court sacrifices what was
once a sovereign prerogative by engaging in judicial activism. As
observed by some commentators, when a judge invokes a particular
interpretive canon to yield a desired outcome, rather than being
guided by the law in light of sound and consistent methodological
reasoning, it may call into question the legitimacy of the Court.96 As
such, the judges of the ICC should have behaved more cautiously
and with due loyalty to the text of the Rome Statute and the intent
of its drafters.
Since the ICC came into operation in 2002, China has kept its
pledge to follow the Court’s developments closely. 97 China has
moved on to deliver pointed remarks about the ICC’s
implementation of the complementarity principle in practice, which
largely echo earlier Chinese concerns made in abstracto. On several
occasions, China stressed that “the Court should perform its
functions in strict conformity with the principle of
complementarity.”98 After the Appeals Chamber’s ruling in Libya
in 2014, China reemphasized the importance of the ICC
94
Fuad Zarbiyev, Judicial Activism in International Law—A Conceptual
Framework for Analysis, 3 J. INT’L. DISP. SETTLEMENT 247, 253 (2012).
95
MICHAEL REISMAN, LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 66 (Nisuke Ando et
al. eds., 2002).
96
Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the
Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 543, 583 (2010).
97
See Xiaomei Guo, in U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 41st mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc.
A/65/PV.41 (Oct. 29, 2010) (discussing how China has been closely following
actions of the ICC); see also Yingfan Wang, in U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at
17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (Jul. 10, 2002) (stating that China plans on following the
operation of the ICC closely).
98
Statement of China at 11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties (Nov.
15,
2012),
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICCASP11-GenDeba-CHN-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript
available in the International Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index); Huikang
Huang, in U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 42nd mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.42 (Oct. 31,
2013); Guo Xiaomei, supra note 5, at 2.
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“perform[ing] its duties with greatest prudence.”99 In 2016, China
cautioned that “the Court serves as a complement to national
jurisdiction, and the Court should fully respect national judicial
sovereignty rather than replace it, still less become a tool for certain
countries or group of countries to pursue their own political
interests.” 100 Through this connection, China further pointed out
that “[t]he question of how to exercise the power of the Court in a
prudent manner under the Rome Statute—thereby gaining trust and
respect from States parties through the Court’s objective and
impartial conduct with a view to realizing the original intent of the
Court—deserves our serious consideration.” 101 This statement
seems to indicate that the ICC’s past practice regarding
complementarity has not yet provided a level of comfort to the
Chinese authorities. As such, if ICC judges continue to interpret the
Rome Statute in such a willful manner and take on more human
rights mandate in their practice, it will not only exacerbate tensions
between state parties and the ICC, but also alienate non-party states,
including China, from joining the Court.
3.3. Fair trial rights and the Chinese domestic criminal justice system
In light of its emerging practice, the ICC’s complementarity
regime may represent more of a threat to state sovereignty than
originally anticipated by the Chinese authorities. However,
addressing these Chinese concerns also requires analyzing the
extent to which international standards of fairness can be fully met
by China’s domestic legal system. The Chinese authorities’ fear
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional reach into its sovereign matters
would be greatly diminished if they had confidence in the
conformity of China’s domestic criminal justice system with
international standards for fair trials.
The right to a fair trial is gaining acceptance as an international
human rights standard in all countries respecting the rule of law. It
is an essential component of many international human rights
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to both
Guo Xiaomei, supra note 5, at 2.
See Yongsheng Li, in U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 38th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/71/PV.38 (Oct. 31, 2016).
101
Id. at 11.
99

100
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of which China is a signatory.102 The right to a fair trial is stipulated
not only in China’s Constitution Law, but also in its Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL), which was enacted in 1979 and has since been
revised three times in 1996, 2012 and 2018. 103 The revised law
promised increased protections for criminal suspects and
defendants, as well as a fairer trial process. 104 On the face, these
amendments have brought China closer to compliance with the
right to a fair trial,105 but they do not fully satisfy the requirements
of international law. Many elements of the right to a fair trial are
still absent from China’s written laws, and certain provisions
introduced by the revisions even contravene international
standards.106 Despite the fact that the proliferation of Chinese laws
meant to protect its citizens’ right to a fair trial, there still remains a
large gap between those rights that are promised in principle and
those that are realized in practice.107
It is clear that the Chinese legal system has been improving in
terms of the legal guarantees of a fair trial, but it has not yet reached
the stage of full compliance with international standards. The right
102
G.A. Res. 217 (X) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
103
Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July. 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980),
art. 8; Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the
Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 11; Xingshi Susong
Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 11 & 14; Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法)
[Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018), art. 11 & 14.
104
See JONATHAN HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S
REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 13 (1996) (discussing some of the protections
that the revised law of China was intended to provide).
105
See Jennifer Smith & Michael Gompers, Realizing Justice: The Development of
Fair Trial Rights in China, 2 CHINESE L. & POL’Y REV. 108, 111–12 (2007) (outlining
how some of the reforms to the Criminal Procedure Law appear to be directed at
protecting the right to a fair trial); see also Mike P.H. Chu, Criminal Procedure Reform
in the People’s Republic of China: The Dilemma of Crime Control and Regime Legitimacy,
18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 157, 158 (2000) (presenting the idea that the reforms made
in the Chinese law at that time were meant to protect the rights of the accused).
106 See Dan Zhu, China, Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal
Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1021, 1039 (2018) (arguing that China is still out of
compliance with certain international human rights standards in spite of the
revisions).
107
See Rongjie Lan, A False Promise of Fair Trials: A Case Study of China’s
Malleable Criminal Procedure Law, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 153, 160–61 (2010)
(providing examples of ways in which the revisions of the CPL are not the same in
principle as they are in practice).
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to counsel and the right to a hearing before an independent,
objective, and competent court are two examples of this noncompliance. Prior to the 1996 amendments, the right to counsel
under Chinese CPL was only attached at the trial stage and did not
exist at the investigative stage.108 It was a tremendous improvement
that suspects could get access to legal counsel from the early stages
of the criminal process, but the revisions did not go far enough to
bring China into compliance with international standards. The most
significant deficiency of the revised law in 1996 was the discretion it
granted the investigating body to use “state secrets” as a justification
for denying suspects access to a lawyer during the investigation
phase.109 Given the expansive definition of “state secret” in China,
it can easily turn into a loophole facing the risk of being abused by
authorities. 110 In the CPL’s 2012 amendment, “state secret” was
replaced by “national security,” “terrorism” and “especially serious
bribery” as exceptions to the right of legal counsel during the
investigation stage.111 It seemed that China was trying to legalize
more grounds to block suspects’ access to counsel, which has further
vitiated the progress toward meeting the internationally recognized
standards. Although the 2018 amendment removed “especially
serious bribery” from the exceptions list, 112 the current CPL is still
deficient according to international standards.
The right to a hearing before an independent, objective, and
competent court is another important aspect of the right to a fair trial,
and judicial independence is an indispensable means to realize such
a right. Although Article 131 of China’s Constitution Law declares
that the people’s courts are judicially independent from
“administrative
organ[s],
public
organization[s],”
and
“individual[s],” the question remains as to whether the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) can be defined as either an administrative
organ or a public organization. 113 The leading role of the CCP,
108
Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 33.
109
Id. at art. 96.
110
See JONATHAN HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S
REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 41 (1996).
111
Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art.
37.
112
Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 26, 2018), art. 34.
113
XIANFA art. 131 (2004) (China).
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affirmed in the Preamble of the current Constitution, further creates
uncertainties as far as its interference in the judiciary is concerned.114
Judicial independence in China also depends on the judiciary’s
ability to function without interference from other external sources,
such as people’s congresses, local governments, the procuracy, the
military, or members of society.115 For example, a significant form
of external intervention actually comes from the procuracy.
According to the Chinese Constitution Law 116 and Criminal
Procedure Law, 117 the procuracy has the power to supervise the
work of judges and the courts and to call for reconsideration of cases.
As the procuracy has dual roles as both prosecutor and supervisor
of the legal process, it has a substantial conflict of interest in
exercising its functions, especially in cases concerning international
crimes. In addition, the Constitution speaks only of independence
of the courts, without specifically referring to any independence of
the individual judges. Although the Judges Law of China provides
that judges have the right to be free from external interference,118 a
contentious issue has been the internal independence “of the judges
hearing the case to issue a final decision without approval from the
adjudicative committee or senior judges on the court.”119 In addition,
internal judicial independence may also be undermined when the
higher courts in China exert undue influence on lower courts
outside the normal channels of appeal.120 Several rounds of judicial
reforms have been conducted in China with the intent to promote
both internal and external independence of the judiciary. 121 For
example, in 2013, the CCP Central Committee adopted the “Decision
114
See Suli Zhu, The Party and the Court, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA
52, 67 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (discussing the relationship between the CCP
and Chinese courts).
115
See Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and
Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 69, 71 (Randall
Peerenboom ed., 2010).
116
XIANFA arts. 129, 135 (2004) (China).
117
Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), arts. 8, 256.
118
Faguan Fa (法官法) [Chinese Judges Law] (amended by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., June 3, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 8(2).
119
See Peerenboom, supra note 115, at 77.
120
Id. at 84. (arguing that “higher courts often engage in a longstanding
practice of responding to inquiries from lower courts for advice regarding legal
issues in particular cases currently before the lower court”).
121
See Lin Feng, The Future of Judicial Independence in China, in ASIA-PACIFIC
JUDICIARIES: INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY AND INTEGRITY 81–82 (Hoong Phun Lee &
Marilyn Pittard eds., 2018) (providing several judicial reforms by CCP in China).
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on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the
Reform,”122 which is widely interpreted as an important progress
towards judicial independence, assuring the autonomy of the courts
on issues relating to their budgets, personnel, and assets. Despite
these noteworthy reforms, a completely independent judiciary in
China is not yet guaranteed at the current stage, and more profound
reforms in the future are needed to realize it.
It should also be noted that not all the changes in the Chinese
judicial system demonstrate a positive step toward providing the
right to a fair trial. For instance, the introduction of “Residential
Surveillance in a Designated Location” (RSDL) by the CPL’s 2012
amendment is arguably a regression in terms of China’s
commitment to promoting fundamental aspects of a fair trial,
including the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention,
as well as the right to be free from torture. According to the
amendment, law enforcement agencies would have the power to
detain persons suspected of crimes related to national security,
terrorism, or especially serious bribery cases in a designated location
by the agencies for up to six months. 123 In plain language, this
means that usual time limits of criminal detention before a formal
arrest can be ignored, and the suspect can be held incommunicado
for half a year. In turn, it opens the door for maltreatment and
torture, as a detained individual is totally isolated from the
surrounding world. The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights has found that incommunicado detention may
violate Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and inhuman,
cruel and degrading treatment.124 In its 2015 review of China, the
Committee Against Torture urged China to repeal “the provisions
of the Criminal Procedure Law that allow suspects to be held de
facto incommunicado, at a designated location, while under
residential surveillance.” 125 Although the 2018 amendment has

122
Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform
(adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, November 12, 2013).
123
See Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law] (amended
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 17, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), arts. 73, 77.
124
See Commission on Human Rights Res. E/CN.4/RED/1997/38 (Nov. 4,
1997), para. 20 (declaring that “prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate
the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment”).
125
See Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic
Report of China, U.N. DOC. CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, at 4 (Feb. 3, 2016).
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excluded the application of RSDL to serious bribery cases, 126 the
agents of state are still granted unfettered power to act in the
preservation of national security and against terrorism. It should be
noted that “endangering national security” or “terrorism” are
vaguely defined offenses that can be manipulated to cover
international crimes.
China’s legal system is still at an early stage of development, and
accordingly is still struggling to realize the promise of the right to a
fair trial. Wide discrepancy often exists in China between the law
on paper and the law in practice. In 2004, the Chinese Constitution
was amended to expressly provide that “the state respects and
safeguards human rights,” 127 indicating perhaps a greater
commitment to effective realization of the rights provided by the
constitution.
Nevertheless, claims based directly on the
Constitution are generally not justiciable. It has long been
contended that China lacks specific procedures and mechanisms for
implementing the Constitution, which subsequently renders the
Constitution toothless. 128 Similarly, Chinese nationals have no
recourse to mechanisms for international enforcement of their fair
trial rights, as China has intentionally opted out of all individual
petition systems of international human rights treaties, and Asia is
the only region not covered by regional human rights treaties.
Although after the latest revision, the Chinese Criminal Procedure
Law is much more in conformity with international standards, the
question remains as to whether these changes have only taken place
in theory. In fact, the right to a fair trial cannot be materialized
without significant legal and judicial reform taking place in China.129
Judicial reform is by no means new in China,130 but the Chinese
authorities’ increasing commitment to the rule of law and human
rights has made it possible for judicial reforms to move forward
speedily in recently years. Since the 18th Communist Party of China
National Congress in late 2012, a number of judicial reforms have
been conducted with the aim of promoting fair trial rights. Several
126
See Xingshi Susong Fa ( 刑 事 诉 讼 法 ) [Criminal Procedure Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 26, 2018, effective
Oct. 26, 2018), arts. 75, 79.
127
XIANFA art. 33, (2004) (China).
128
See Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of
Constitutional Development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 952 (2010).
129
See Lan, supra note 107, at 165.
130
See Keyuan Zou, Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and Future
Prospects, 36 INT’L L. 1039, 1039 (2002) (discussing legal reforms as early as 1978).
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white papers detailing the progress of judicial reforms have been
issued regularly by the Chinese government. 131 The most recent
white paper “Progress in Human Rights over the 40 Years of Reform
and Opening Up in China” noted that China has effectively
enhanced judicial protection of human rights, and that progress has
been boosted under the country’s deepened judicial reform. 132
Although the Chinese authorities have been trying to sustain the
momentum for judicial reform, one cannot be overly optimistic
about immediate prospects for China’s compliance with
internationally recognized fair trial standards. While committed to
following international rules and standards, China constantly insists
on a relativistic approach to human rights protection based on each
country’s unique conditions and is trying to build up a judicial
system that reflects its own history, culture, values, and political
peculiarities.133 The context of the ICC’s complementarity regime
underscores the importance of fully respecting “choice by relevant
states or regions for specific means to realize justice,” and takes into
account “their judicial traditions and practical needs.”134 In fact, the
Chinese authorities have been using “Chinese characteristics” for
explaining the actual divergence between China’s CPL and
international standards, which will be discussed later in this article.

131
See Info. Off. of the St. Council, China, Whitepaper on Judicial Reform in China
(Oct.
2012),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_2814749
83043170.htm [https://perma.cc/U9LY-TF4N]; Sup. People’s Ct, China, White
Paper on Judicial Reform in China (Feb. 29, 2016), http://english.court.gov.cn/201603/03/content_23724636.htm [https://perma.cc/9QF2-AYVW].
132
See Info. Off. of the St. Council, China, Progress in Human Rights over the 40
Years
of
Reform
and
Opening
Up
in
China
(Dec.
2018),
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/37884/Document/1643472/1643472.htm
[https://perma.cc/EJJ3-6SZ6].
133
See Hainian Liu, On the View on Human Rights with Chinese Characteristics,
HUM.
RTS.
(May
3,
2017),
CHINA
http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/2017/MAGAZINES_0503/7964.html
[https://perma.cc/8U8V-A2P8].
134
See Statement of China at 11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties
(Nov. 15, 2012), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/GenDeba/ICCASP11-GenDeba-CHN-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRP3-KVGD] (transcript
available in the International Criminal Court’s ASP Document Index).
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COMPLEMENTARITY AND AUTOMATIC JURISDICTION OF THE ICC:
CONCERNS OF CHINA

Apart from its fair trial concerns, China also considered the
concept of automatic jurisdiction to be inconsistent with the
principle of complementarity. As illustrated earlier, due to
automatic jurisdiction of the ICC, the principle of complementarity
has no effect in determining the existence of the jurisdiction,
although it still plays a role at the level of the exercise of jurisdiction.
In fact, China’s concern towards the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction has
resonance with its traditional position with respect to international
judicial bodies, although the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction is
articulated in the specific ICC context.
4.1. China’s traditional concerns towards compulsory jurisdiction
Historically, China kept a distance from international
adjudication and considered compulsory jurisdiction to be
antithetical to state sovereignty. In the view of China:
States should settle their disputes through negotiation and
consultation . . . States were free to choose other means to
settle their disputes. However, if a sovereign State were
asked to accept unconditionally the compulsory jurisdiction
of an international judicial organ, that would amount to
placing that organ above the sovereign State, which was
contrary to the principle of State sovereignty.135
However, there has been greater Chinese engagement with a
wider range of international adjudicative bodies since the 1990s,
contemporary with or even after the ICC negotiation. It seems that
China’s primary concern regarding compulsory jurisdiction which
had traditionally restricted its engagement with international
adjudication has been obviated in the contexts of the World Trade
Organization, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. 136 Should the ICC be considered along the same lines, its
135
See Yali Lai, in The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 60th
Plenary mtg., at 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/SR. 60 (Vol. 5) (1976).
136
See Zhu, supra note 12, at 54–55.
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automatic jurisdiction would no longer be regarded as an
impediment to China’s accession to the Rome Statute.
While there has been substantial Chinese acceptance in relation
to compulsory jurisdiction of international juridical bodies in
economic and technical areas, there is still a reluctance to do so in
certain fields, including military activities, sovereignty disputes,
and more significantly, human rights. It is apparent that the
different subject areas over which each body has jurisdiction have
also influenced China’s approach towards international
adjudication. Relinquishing control in trade and investment cases
coincides with economic interests, which are customarily prioritized
and are less politically sensitive in China. In addition, resolving
economic disputes through an international legal forum can also
help China to diffuse public anxiety and political tensions that can
arise within its domestic market, and thus to maintain political
stability. 137 Even though there has been a greater Chinese
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial
bodies, China still jealously guards its prerogatives to select the
areas in which it will relinquish sovereignty. It is obvious that China
has had and will continue to have sovereignty concerns with respect
to the way in which certain international human rights instruments
and their associated institutional architecture operate, but the ICC is
not the appropriate box in which to place these kinds of concerns if
its mandate could be properly perceived by the Chinese authorities.
While international human rights bodies mainly deal with ordinary
human rights violations, the ICC is only concerned with gross
human rights violations that amount to international crimes. In fact,
China’s past practice has implicitly acknowledged the dichotomy
between ordinary human rights violations and gross human rights
violations.
4.2. China’s dichotomy towards human rights violations
In the view of China, “human rights are essential matters within
the domestic jurisdiction of a country. Respect for each country’s
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are universally
recognized principles of international law, which . . . of course [are]
137
See Kennan J. Castel-Fodor, Providing a Release Valve: The U.S.-China
Experience with the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 201, 222
(2013).
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applicable to the field of human rights as well.”138 As such, China’s
position on human rights issues was, to a large extent, based on the
understanding that human rights law enforcement can be
administrated only by sovereign states and not through an
international mechanism. While the Chinese authorities have
ratified most of the international human rights treaties, including
major international conventions, 139 they consistently refuse to
recognize the competence of the relevant human rights governing
bodies to receive and consider individual complaints of human
rights violations against China. 140 Notwithstanding this position,
China left some room for international intervention with respect to
gross human rights violations by acknowledging that “the
International Community should interfere with and stop acts that
endanger world peace and security, such as gross human rights
violations caused by colonialism, racism, foreign aggression and
occupation, as well as apartheid, racial discrimination, genocide,
slave trade and serious violation of human rights by international
terrorist organizations.”141 In its 2005 Position Paper on UN reform,
China reiterated that “each state shoulders the primary
responsibility to protect its own population,” but it also explicitly
acknowledged that “when a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it
is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and
defuse the crisis.”142 China’s different approaches towards different
kinds of human rights violations have also been confirmed by the
Chinese State Council. 143 While China continues to champion a
strong concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in
interstate relations, it does not rule out, but indeed actively supports,
certain international interventions to prevent and punish the most
serious violations of human rights that amount to international
138
See Info. Off. of the St. Council, China, Chapter X: Active Participation in
International Human Rights Activities (1991), http://www.china.org.cn/ewhite/7/7-L.htm [https://perma.cc/HE98-K2NQ].
139
See HANQIN XUE, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2012).
140
See Zhu, supra note 12, at 51.
141
See Info. Off. of the St. Council, supra note 138.
142
See Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN,
Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, CHINA
U.N.
(June
7,
2005),
http://www.chinaun.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm [https://perma.cc/6PWE-AUQ3].
143
See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR
MODEL FOR THE REST? 127–28 (2007) (discussing China’s “renewed emphasis on
democratic centralism” as “an attempt to manage diverse views”).
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crimes. There has been a growing willingness by China to endorse
multilateral humanitarian interventions subject to certain conditions
being met.144 Most significantly, in 2011, China allowed the passage
of the Security Council Resolution 1970, which formed the legal
basis for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War to protect
civilians from mass atrocities. 145 It has also been supportive of
establishing a system of international criminal justice designed to
adjudicate gross human rights violations that amount to
international crimes. Though a non-party state to the Rome Statute,
China did not seek to use its veto power to block the Security
Council referrals of situations of mass atrocities in either Darfur or
Libya to the ICC.146
It appears that ordinary human rights violations and gross
human rights violations can be viewed as two ends of the spectrum
of Chinese human rights policy. While China has cautiously
embraced international interventions on gross human rights
violations as manifested by R2P and the ICC, it is not willing to
subject itself to international scrutiny for ordinary human rights
violations represented by traditional human rights treaty bodies. In
addition to the lack of legal competence to accept international
supervision on ordinary human rights violations, China may also
have some policy concerns that human rights could be used by
Western states as an instrument to contain China. In the context of
the Rome Statute, China is particularly concerned that the ICC
would become an appeals court, examining a state’s compliance
with international human rights standards.
It is true that the admissibility scheme under the Rome Statute is
analogous to the approach taken by international human rights
bodies, which gives national systems priority in terms of resolving
their own human rights problems—only when they fail to do so may

144
Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217,
220 (2010).
145
See Andrew Garwood-Gowers, China and the “Responsibility to Protect”: The
Implications of the Libyan Intervention, 2 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 375, 383-86 (2012)
(expressing that “[g]iven the gravity and immediacy of the threat to civilians,
blocking a resolution would have attracted significant criticism”).
146
China abstained in the Security Council vote referring the situation in
Darfur to the ICC. S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). China voted in favor of the
Security Council resolution referring the situation of Libya to the ICC. S.C. Res. 1970
(Feb. 26, 2011).
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the international bodies proceed.147 The similarity between the ICC
and the human rights bodies is that both types of international
bodies will not proceed with a case unless domestic adjudication or
remedies are unavailable. However, the substantive criteria for
determining whether the international body in question should step
in are different. With regard to human rights treaty bodies,
domestic jurisdictions enjoy primacy in dealing with their own
alleged human rights violations, and only when “available” and
“effective” domestic remedies have been exhausted can the
international body proceed.148 Under the Rome Statute, the ICC will
only take over if the national judicial system is “unable” or
“unwilling” to take legal action.149 In essence, the different criteria
are due to their different mandates. Actually, “[t]he ICC was not
created as a human rights court stricto sensu “150 or “an institution to
monitor human rights.”151 The admissibility regime addresses only
the particular aspects of the proceedings which are referred to in
Article 17, whereas international law provides alternative remedies
to address breaches of human rights of the accused in the context of
traditional international human rights bodies, such as the Human
Rights Committee. 152 As such, if the ICC strictly refrains from
performing the mandates of traditional human rights courts, the
automatic jurisdiction under the Rome Statute should no longer be
regarded as an impediment to China’s direct engagement with the
Court, in light of China’s dichotomy towards human rights
violations. This, to a significant extent, depends on the Court’s
147
Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 15, 27 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
148
WOUTER VANDENHOLE, THE PROCEDURES BEFORE THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY BODIES: DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE? 290 (2004); see also DINAH SHELTON,
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 113–16 (1999) (discussing wrongful
death cases where a state’s failure to prosecute counted as an additional injury
when those cases were litigated in international courts).
149
STIGEN, supra note 60, at 219 (stating that “[o]riginally, the ILC did not
propose the term ‘genuinely’ but rather the terms ‘[not] available’ and
‘[in]effective,’ both well-known terms from a part of human rights law dealing with
the adequacy of national proceedings. The subsequent substitution by the terms
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ makes human rights jurisprudence less relevant”).
150
Benzing, supra note 17, at 598.
151
Rolf E. Fife, The International Criminal Court: Whence it Came, Where it Goes,
69 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 63, 66 (2000).
152
See CRYER, supra note 61, at 157 (suggesting that it is more proper to address
general human rights considerations about the conduct of national prosecutions by
human rights treaties and bodies).
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current and future practice in interpreting the criteria of
unwillingness. If the ICC continues to examine a state’s compliance
with international human rights standards during its determination
of admissibility, it would inevitably trigger China’s sensitivities
about human rights courts of the traditional kind and its anxieties
about international scrutiny of ordinary human rights violations,
especially those relating to fair trial rights. It should be noted that
China has signed but not yet ratified the ICCPR,153 which guarantees
fair trial rights ranging from the right to trial before an independent
and impartial court to the right to be presumed innocent. 154
Although in recent years the Chinese criminal justice system has
introduced several key rights and procedural safeguards for
criminal defendants, the right to a fair trial is still far from a reality
in China due to the lack of necessary guarantees to ensure
compliance in practice.
4.3. Chinese Characteristics, Asian Values, and Human Rights
China’s official human rights discourse has also attached great
importance to “Chinese characteristics,”155 which arguably explains
the actual discrepancies between China’s Criminal Procedure Law
and international standards. According to the Chinese authorities,
“no country in its effort to realize and protect human rights can take
a route that is divorced from its history and its economic, political
and cultural realities,”156 and “human rights can only advance in the
context of national conditions and people’s needs.” 157 The
authorities pointed out that “during the past 40 years of reform and
opening-up, China has consistently combined the universality and
particularity of human rights . . . and pioneered a path of human
rights developed with Chinese characteristics in line with its own

153
UNITED NATION OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, RATIFICATION OF 18
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (indicating
that China signed ICCPR in 1998).
154
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 14, (Dec. 16, 1966).
155
See Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (2018), supra note 132, Foreword
(explaining how “[r]eform . . . has opened up a path of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, and ushered in a new chapter in the development of human rights”).
156
Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (1991), supra note 138.
157
See Info. Off. of the St. Council of China (2018), supra note 132, VIII. Path of
Human Rights Protection Suited to National Conditions.
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conditions.”158 As such, in the view of the Chinese authorities, the
debate about the compliance of the Chinese criminal justice system
with international human rights law will be distorted if taken
exclusively from perspectives outside of China’s unique history,
culture, values, and political system. China’s insistence on Chinese
characteristics also reflects its continued adherence to a strict
concept of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.
The culture-specific understanding of human rights and the
primacy of state sovereignty have also emerged as key elements of
the “Asian values,” which are deeply embedded in Asian inter-state
relations. The debate over Asian values originated during the 1993
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, largely in response to
a pre-conference regional document known as the Bangkok
Declaration, which was signed by over forty Asian states, including
China.159 While reaffirming “the principles of respect for national
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal
affairs of states,” the Bangkok Declaration argued for the
importance of unique Asian historical, cultural, and religious factors
in determining human rights standards.160 Although the document
never uses the term “Asian values,” “it was seen by many . . . as
asserting an Asian viewpoint.” 161 At the subsequent World
Conference, “Chinese and Singaporean delegates propagated a
culture-specific notion of human rights” in contrast to a “universalistic
interpretation of human rights.”162 In this connection, the Member
States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights in 2012, using
the Vienna Declaration as a benchmark. 163 According to the
proponent of “Asian values,” human rights are a matter of national
sovereignty, and each nation should be allowed to adopt standards
for the right to a trial that are fair in the context of its specific culture.
158
Xu Jinquan, China’s perspective on human rights widely understood, recognized,
supported:
diplomat,
XINHUA
NET
(Nov.
7,
2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/07/c_137590004.htm
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159
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161
Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 311 (2000).
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Christian Welzel, The Asian Values Thesis Revisited: Evidence from the World
Values Surveys, 12 JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2011).
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See William J. Jones, Universalizing Human Rights the ASEAN Way, 3 INT’L J.
SOC. SCI. 72, 77–78 (2014).
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However, neither Chinese characteristics nor Asian values have
been advanced in the context of gross violations of human rights.
Cultural diversity cannot justify gross violations of human rights.164
Further, “[c]ultural relativist arguments used by ASEAN states to
contest the universality of human rights are arguably prima facie
inapplicable to the international crimes contained in the ICC
Statute.”165 Although there is general reticence among Asian states
towards universal jurisdiction, 166 “Asian values have never been
invoked to defend egregious human rights violations in the same
manner as they have been invoked to contest violations of human
rights regarded as ‘Western’.”167 From a Chinese perspective, the
contestability of ordinary human rights violations on the basis of
Chinese characteristics contrasts with the universality of gross
human rights violations, but no clear dividing line between the two
categories has been provided by the authorities. In fact, “gross,”
“serious,” “grave,” “flagrant,” and other qualifiers (“egregious,”
“massive”) are often used interchangeably and sometimes
cumulatively by various international and regional human rights
bodies, and no method has been agreed upon for deciding whether
a given act should be characterized as a gross human rights
violation. 168 Likely the best analogy to Chinese dichotomy on
human rights is ASEAN states’ distinction between ‘core’ and noncore human rights, but the boundary there is also fuzzy.169 Core
human rights are often regarded as non-derogable rights, jus cogens,
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See Bilahari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to Human Rights, 89 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 146, 147 (1995) (arguing that while Western and Asian conceptions of
human rights may differ in certain ways, there are nevertheless fundamental
understanding of certain human rights abuses shared across cultures).
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(2013).
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GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 54, 58 (2016).
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International Human Rights Law’, ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 6 (2014),
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obligations erga omnes, 170 “[b]ut these equations [also] require
further explanation” and examination.” 171 Though the notion of
“gross violation” or “core human rights” has usually been
approached from the perspective of human rights law, international
criminalization of serious human rights violations are also relevant
in defining the boundaries.
Core international crimes such as genocide and crimes against
humanity constitute important manifestations of serious human
rights violations. The selection of core crimes for which the ICC is
competent to adjudicate is limited to “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole,” 172 and the
drafters of the Rome Statute relied on customary international law
in defining these crimes. While “a potent customary international
law norm rejecting impunity for serious violations of ‘core’ human
rights has emerged,”173 the scope of customary international law has
been contested. One hotly debated issue which proved to be
concerning for China and other Asian states was whether a nexus to
armed conflict needed to be included in the definition of crimes
against humanity. 174 Without a linkage to armed conflict, China
maintained, “many actions listed under that heading of the crimes
against humanity belongs to the area of human rights rather than
international criminal law.”175 It further pointed out that:
what the international community needed at the current
stage was not a human rights court but a criminal court that
punished international crimes of exceptional gravity. The
injection of human rights elements would lead to a
170
See Diane A. Desierto, Universalizing Core Human Rights in the “New”
ASEAN: A Reassessment of Culture and Development Justifications Against the Global
Rejection of Impunity, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L L. 77, 95 (2009).
171
Teraya Koji, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond:
From the Perspective of Non-derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 917, 920 (2001).
172
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
173
See Desierto, supra note 170, at 84.
174
See Darryl Robinson & Herman von Hebel, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of
the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 79, 91 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (describing how
“[a]s in the preparatory negotiations, the majority controversies in the negotiations
in Rome concerned the threshold test: namely, whether such crimes could only
occur in armed conflict”).
175
Zhu, supra note 34, at 149 (quoting Statement by Mr. Guangya Wang on the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], July 29, 1998
(China).
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proliferation of human rights cases, weaken the mandate of
the Court to punish the most serious crimes and thus defeat
the purpose of establishing such a court.176
As discussed earlier, the customary law surrounding crimes
against humanity was developed significantly through innovative
interpretations by the ad hoc tribunals. Due to the nature of that
process and the power conferred on the ad hoc tribunals to develop
individual criminal responsibility, China did not have an
opportunity to influence the outcomes or claim to be a persistent
objector within that institutional context. The overwhelming
evidence now points in the opposite direction of the Chinese view
on these issues, and the customary law status of crimes against
humanity as reflected in the Rome Statute are now firmly
entrenched. It seems that the boundary between ordinary human
rights violations and gross human rights violations is further
blurred due to the expansion of international criminal law. As the
Draft International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Humanity retains the definition of crimes against
humanity under the Rome Statute, China reiterated its reservations
over the omission of a nexus to conflict.177
Although international law on core human rights violations
relating to both state and individual accountabilities is not evolving
in a way that is completely along the lines of the Chinese thinking,
it is difficult for China and other Asian states to invoke Chinese
characteristics or Asian values to defend crimes against humanity
committed during peace time in the same manner as they have been
invoked to contest violations of undisputed non-core human rights.
Nonetheless, this may well be a specific concern among states in a
region where non-interference has historically permitted internal
state-committed atrocities to remain unpunished. Unlike other
regions of the world, there is not yet a well-developed and effective
regional system of human rights protection in Asia, which is a
reflection of the general reluctance at the regional governmental
level to adopt an internationalized approach to issues that are
traditionally seen as internal matters, particularly questions relating
to non-core human rights violations and accountability measures.
This cautious Asian approach to human rights however does not
necessarily affect their support for international criminal law.
Rather, there is a growing acceptance among Asian states for
176
177
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individual criminal responsibility regarding core human rights
violations. As observed by former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari
Kausikan:
International law has evolved to the point that how a country
treats its citizens is no longer a matter for its exclusive
determination. But international human rights law still coexists uneasily, and in as yet an unresolved matter, with the
fundamental principle of national sovereignty. It would
thus be prudent to restrict such discussions to gross and
egregious violations of human rights, which clearly admit of
no derogation on the grounds of national sovereignty.
Attempting to expand the debate to areas where there are
legitimate national differences of interpretation or
implementation only exacerbates misunderstanding and
prevents consensus.178
This holds particularly true for the ICC’s implementation of its
mandate, which is to end impunity for most serious international
crimes rather than monitoring the fairness of domestic proceedings.
However, in light of the emerging practice of the ICC on
complementarity, the risk to sovereignty and Asian values posed by
the ICC may be higher than originally anticipated.
5.

CONCLUSION

The Chinese concerns regarding the complementarity regime of
the ICC at one level relate to the uncertainties about the means by
which particular provisions regarding admissibility would be
applied; at another level they echo China’s traditional concerns with
respect to international judicial bodies. However, since Chinese
formulation of its concerns some 20 years ago, there have been
developments in practice both in the specific ICC context and in the
wider context of China’s engagement with international
adjudicative bodies. As such, there is both an obvious need and
opportunity for the Chinese authorities to reassess its objections
towards the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime, which were
articulated as one of the legal barriers preventing China from
moving towards more direct engagement with the ICC.

178
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Although China by and large supported the principle of
complementarity, it had reservations over the way in which
complementarity was eventually implemented in the Rome Statute.
As the Statute granted the ICC automatic jurisdiction, which was
considered by China as undermining state sovereignty and the
principle of complementarity, therefore, the extent to which the
reduced role of state consent in determining the existence of the
ICC’s jurisdiction was effectively addressed by the way in which the
principle of complementarity was factored into the Statute as part of
the admissibility regime could be key to assessing the underlying
Chinese concerns. Back in 1998, a lingering hesitation existed
among Chinese policy-makers that the ICC might become an
appeals court, judging a state’s compliance with international
human rights standards when considering the issue of admissibility.
Although the Rome Statute was clear in its core content on
admissibility, there was still a lack of clarity as to precisely how
aspects of admissibility would apply in practice.
It is
understandable that China regarded the Court with a degree of
suspicion while the uncertainties remained. As such, the practice of
the relevant organs of the ICC in interpreting the criteria of
unwillingness is enormously important in China’s reconsideration
of its fair trial concerns. By becoming a state party to the ICC Statute,
China will be committed to bringing to account those responsible for
international crimes, but it does not anticipate exposing itself to
unreasonable or unwelcome levels of scrutiny, over such issues as
the fairness of its domestic criminal justice system. Although
China’s national judicial system with Chinese characteristics is still
deficient by universal human rights standards, the ICC lacks
authority in mainstreaming national courts to dispense justice
according to international norms.
China’s objection to the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction, to some
extent, mirrors its traditional approach towards international
adjudication. However, since the 1990s, the primary concern about
compulsory jurisdiction which had traditionally surrounded the
discussion of Chinese engagement with international adjudication
has been broadly resolved in relation to a range of international
adjudicative bodies properly so-called. Although the substantial
Chinese movements in relation to international adjudication have
been least pronounced in the domain of human rights, China has
recognized that it is a common task of the international community
as a whole to put a stop to atrocities and other forms of grave and
massive violations of human rights, in contrast to categorizing
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ordinary human rights violations as internal affairs and therefore
subject to Chinese characteristics. If China can be fully assured that
a state’s compliance with international human rights instruments is
not within the purview of the ICC, the ICC’s automatic jurisdiction
will no longer be considered as an obstacle in the way of China’s full
participation in the ICC. This, to a great extent, depends upon the
ICC’s practical application of the criteria of unwillingness. However,
due to the judicial activism of the ICC judges, the trajectory of the
post-Rome developments in practice are arguably not heading
towards alleviating the underlying Chinese fair trial concerns. If the
Court continues to take on the role of securing fairness at national
proceedings, it would indeed add a dimension entirely different
from the initial idea for the establishment of the ICC, and it would
inevitably trigger China’s concern about human rights issues not
only in the specific ICC context but also in the wider context of
international adjudication. This kind of practice will similarly
hinder membership among other Asian states because of the
perceived threat to Asian values, which consider due process rights
a matter of state sovereignty and stress that they need to be balanced
with territorial integrity and non-interference, as well as with
specific cultural, social, economic, and political circumstances. As
such, Chinese characteristics and Asian values can be used as a
legitimate basis for China and other Asian states’ resistance to the
ICC treaty.
While the current gap between China and the ICC has been
partly caused by the Court’s seemingly expanded mandate over
ordinary human rights violations in the context of complementarity,
there have been other legal and policy factors influencing the
Chinese government’s attitude towards the Court, including the
proprio motu power of the ICC Prosecutor, the Court’s jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression, and the definitions of the core crimes.
Since these concerns were first raised in the 1990s, there have been
significant developments with regard to the amendment of the
Rome Statute, the practice of the Court and the Security Council, and
even in the content of customary international law. The year 2018
marks the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute, and it presents
China an opportunity to re-examine its concerns towards the Statute
to see if they have become less robust or have been resolved in a
manner which is in line with Chinese thinking over the past two
decades. For example, the Amendments to the Rome Statute
adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010 directly touched
China’s pre-existing concerns about the crime of aggression. China’s
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concerns regarding the definitions of crimes against humanity and
war crimes are also related to fields of customary international law
that have been undergoing rapid developments in the past 20 years.
Were China to take this opportunity to make a reassessment, the
Chinese concerns towards the ICC’s complementarity regime might
still be considered an obstacle for China’s accession to the Court.
Whether these concerns will be diminished in years to come will
largely depends on the ICC’s future interpretation of the criteria of
“willingness.”
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